<br /> OpenSSH packages not vulnerable – Debian Planet

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    OpenSSH packages not vulnerable
    Submitted by robster on Thursday, August 01, 2002 – 16:22
    SecurityThe OpenSSH 3.4p1 packages on the OpenBSD FTP server were trojaned earlier today, as discovered by a FreeBSD user, Edwin Groothuis. The trojan only works at build time, and binaries produced from the source are not vulnerable, as detailed on his weblog (copied to /. because of bandwidth limitations).

    The Debian packages were created some time ago from original untrojaned tarballs and are thus not affected in this way (and nor is the package maintainer’s machine). The source tarball and the binary packages in the Debian archive are not affected, as confirmed by the ssh package maintainer, and several other Debian developers.

    Category: News

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    Subject: Thanks Robster
    Author: seeS
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 23:23
    Hopefully this article will cut down the security traffic with people asking “are we vulnerable”?
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    Subject: secure by default …
    Author: fork
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 22:38
    It seems that De Raadt stuf are not alway’s secure 😉 This is not a flame, this just prove that even a paranoiac can be hacked.

    I had found more information here : http://www.deadly.org/article.php3?sid=20020801122759&mode=flat

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    Subject: Not OpenBSD’s fault
    Author: by-tor
    Date: Friday, 2002/08/02 – 20:41
    Keep in mind, this has absolutely nothing to do with OpenBSD. The attack occured because of Solaris, the OS running on the SUNsite hosting openbsd’s public services. If you blame anyone, blame SUN and their proprietary technology. Lets not bash OpenBSD, its not their fault. Besides, they are our OpenSource brothers. We dont compete with *BSD (Debian GNU/BSD).


    Be not anxious about what you have, but about what you are.
    — Pope St. Gregory I

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    Subject: I don’t bash *BSD
    Author: fork
    Date: Saturday, 2002/08/03 – 05:23
    As I said, I don’t blame anyone. I just observe even when people make a very good effort to prevent attack, it is not always possible to prevent that.

    I think that debian should not compete with *BSD (free/net/openBSD are great OS), but should try to learn from this attack.

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    Subject: Why are debian package signatures not verified on the client?
    Author: molo
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 18:12
    When I download a debian package, I want to be able to verify (locally, on the client) that the package is the original, uploaded by the package maintainer (or compiled by my arch’s buildd).

    As it currently stands, I believe that the package signatures are checked only when the file gets uploaded to the archive. Is this correct?

    I’d like to have a detached OpenPGP signature for each .deb downloaded, and have apt-get verify each package automaticly. Forgive me for not trusting the debian mirror system, but how can you guarantee that there isn’t a hacked transparent proxy between me and the mirror, replacing .debs?

    Architechures with a buildd would be a bit more work, because one needs to verify two levels of data – the original source package uploaded by the maintainer, and the binary compiled by the buildd.

    -molo

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    Subject: OK…
    Author: robot101
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 20:10
    • debs are md5summed and listed in Packages files
    • dsc, tar.gz and diff.gz are md5summed and listed in Sources files
    • apt refuses to install packages if their md5sum doesn’t match, and reinstalls them if one with an unmatching md5sum is already installed
    • Packages and Sources files are md5summed and listed in Release files
    • and you check those with aj’s apt-check-sigs script
    • for stable and security, the key is the release manager’s or the security team’s, and is stored ‘elsewhere’
    • for testing and unstable, the key is stored on the ftp master server and signs the generated files every day automatically

    The signed .changes files which have the md5sums of the sources and debs at upload are stored for some time on the master server, but no longer seem to be publically available.

    Robster is a monkey

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    Subject: this is not suffisent
    Author: fork
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 22:42
    This does not prevent introduction of this kind of trojan into debian archive. Only a check from te maintainer (and a lot of “paranoia”) can save our soul.
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    Subject: This kind of trojan…
    Author: robot101
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 23:37
    Doesn’t affect the Debian archive, it affects the machine upon which source is built. All this signature checking does is ensure that what you download and install is that which was uploaded to the server by the trusted Debian developer, assuming the master server has not been compromised.

    Robster is a monkey
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    Subject: This *particlar* trojan..
    Author: molo
    Date: Friday, 2002/08/02 – 01:28
    This kind of trojan… Doesn’t affect the Debian archive, it affects the machine upon which source is built.

    This particular trojan doesn’t affect binaries, correct. However, this kind of trojan (that is, ones in source tarballs) absolutely 100% can effect the debian archive binaries.

    Besides, once the guy roots a debian maintainer’s build machine, what’s preventing him from stealing the guy’s private key and installing a keylogger to get the passphrase? We are lucky that this time someone found the problem within 6 hours.

    -molo

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    Subject: However, source is source so
    Author: jeremy
    Date: Friday, 2002/08/16 – 10:46
    However, source is source so any trojan should hopefully be alot easier to discover. If the same thing happened with binaries it, might take a lot longer to find out and by that time it could be too late. Perhaps we should also encourage upstream maintainers to sign their source with GPG 🙂
    [ Please login, or register ]

     

    Subject: Ok, good start, but…
    Author: molo
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 21:47
    Ok, I’m glad this stuff is able to be validated, but:

    1. This is not part of the standard distribution – people have to know about it and go find it.
    2. This is not integrated into APT. If I forget (or don’t script things) to use apt-check-sigs after each apt-get update, its not going to help.
    3. To trojan those people that ignore the release file’s signature (I would imagine this is the vast majority), one can just re-generate the md5sums for everything.

    In short, this is a good beginning, but its not a solution yet.

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    Subject: md5?
    Author: annoia
    Date: Thursday, 2002/08/01 – 19:29
    Basically, what you want is the posibillity to check the md5-sum, which is actually a very sensible request.

    When do we get that? HAVE we got that? Why not? 😉

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